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Abstract—Machine learning algorithms are increasingly in-
fluencing our decisions and interacting with us in all parts of
our daily lives. Therefore, just like for power plants, highways,
and myriad other engineered sociotechnical systems, we must
consider the safety of systems involving machine learning. In
this paper, we first discuss the definition of safety in terms of
risk, epistemic uncertainty, and the harm incurred by unwanted
outcomes. Then we examine dimensions, such as the choice of
cost function and the appropriateness of minimizing the empirical
average training cost, along which certain real-world applications
may not be completely amenable to the foundational principle of
modern statistical machine learning: empirical risk minimization.
In particular, we note an emerging dichotomy of applications:
ones in which safety is important and risk minimization is not the
complete story (we name these Type A applications), and ones in
which safety is not so critical and risk minimization is sufficient
(we name these Type B applications). Finally, we discuss how four
different strategies for achieving safety in engineering (inherently
safe design, safety reserves, safe fail, and procedural safeguards)
can be mapped to the machine learning context through inter-
pretability and causality of predictive models, objectives beyond
expected prediction accuracy, human involvement for labeling
difficult or rare examples, and user experience design of software.
I. INTRODUCTION
In recent years, machine learning algorithms have started
influencing every part of our lives, including health and
wellness, law and order, commerce, entertainment, finance,
human capital management, communication, transportation,
and philanthropy. As the algorithms, the data on which they
are trained, and the models they produce are getting more
powerful and more ingrained in society, questions about safety
must be examined. It may be argued that machine learning
systems are simply tools, that they will soon have a general
intelligence that surpasses human abilities, or something in-
between, but from all perspectives, they are technological
components of larger sociotechnical systems that may have
to be engineered with safety in mind [1].
Safety is a commonly used term across engineering dis-
ciplines connoting the absence of failures or conditions that
render a system dangerous [2], cf. safe food and water, safe
vehicles and highways, safe medical treatments, safe toys,
safe neighborhoods, and safe industrial plants. Each of the
domains has specific design principles and regulations that are
applicable only to it; only a few works in the literature attempt
a precise definition applicable to a broad set of domains and
systems [3].
In particular, a general definition of safety is the mini-
mization of risk and epistemic uncertainty (understood in the
usual decision-theoretic senses of the words) associated with
unwanted outcomes that are severe enough to be seen as
harmful [3]. The epistemic uncertainty part of the definition is
key, because harmful outcomes often occur in regimes and
operating conditions that are rare, unexpected, or underde-
termined. The cost magnitude of unwanted outcomes is also
key, because safety is not concerned with reducing undesired
outcomes of an inconsequential nature.
With such a definition of safety, it is possible to consider
domains that do not have existing safety principles and reg-
ulations such as machine learning. The first contribution of
this work is to critically examine the foundational statistical
machine learning principles of empirical risk minimization
and structural risk minimization [4] from the perspective of
safety. We discuss how they, as their names imply, do not
deal with epistemic uncertainty. Furthermore, the principles
rely on average losses and laws of large numbers-type argu-
ments, which may not necessarily be fully applicable when
considering safety. Moreover, the loss functions involved in
the formulations are abstract distortions between true and
predicted values rather than application-specific quantities
measuring loss of life, loss of quality of life, etc. that can
be judged harmful or not [5]. To the best of our knowledge,
there is no existing work on analyzing machine learning using
precise decision-theoretic definitions of safety.
A second contribution of this paper emerges from examining
safety in formulating machine learning problems. We find
that applications of machine learning systems cluster into two
types: (A) applications in which model predictions are used
to support consequential decisions that can have a profound
effect on people’s lives, and (B) applications in which model
predictions are used in settings of low consequence and large
scale. Type A applications are the ones in which safety is
paramount. We have previously noted the dichotomy of Type
A and Type B applications of machine learning and data
science in [6], but did not pose them as consequences of safety
definitions. The related literature is cited in [6], but again, does
not stem from safety.
The final contribution of the paper is the discussion of
strategies to increase the safety of sociotechnical systems with
machine learning components. Four categories of approaches
have been identified for promoting safety in general [7]:
inherently safe design, safety reserves, safe fail, and procedural
safeguards. We find and discuss examples of all of these
approaches specifically for machine learning algorithms and
especially to mitigate epistemic uncertainty. Through this
contribution, we can recommend strategies to engineer safer
machine learning methods and set an agenda for further
machine learning safety research.
The remainder of the paper is organized in the following
manner. In Section II, we discuss harm, risk, uncertainty and
the definition of safety. In Section III, we examine statistical
machine learning from the safety perspective. Section IV sets
forth two types of machine learning applications distinguished
by their relationship to safety. Section V describes ways of
achieving safety in general and their specializations to machine
learning. Section VI concludes.
II. DEFINITION OF SAFETY
The term safety can have many different technical and non-
technical meanings, but for our purposes, we would like to
work with a precise, domain-agnostic definition. As well-
described in [3], [7] and numerous references therein, such
a definition of safety begins with outcomes and events. A
system yields an outcome based on its state and the inputs
it receives; the outcome event may be desired or undesired.
Single events and sets of events have associated costs that
can be measured and quantified by society (sometimes with
difficulty). A numeric level of morbidity, for example, can be
the cost of an outcome. An undesired outcome is only a harm
if its cost exceeds some threshold. Unwanted events of small
severity are not counted as safety issues.
The next step in defining safety is to bring in decision theory
and the concepts of risk and epistemic uncertainty. Risk is the
expected value of the cost of harm: we do not know what
the outcome will be, but its distribution is known and we
can calculate the expectation of its cost. With uncertainty, we
still do not know what the outcome will be, but in contrast
to risk, its probability distribution is also unknown (or only
partially known). Epistemic uncertainty, in contrast to aleatoric
uncertainty, results from lack of knowledge that could be
obtained in principle, but may be practically intractable to
gather. Some decision theorists argue that all uncertainty can
be captured probabilistically, but we maintain the distinction
between risk and uncertainty herein, following [3].
Safety is the reduction or minimization of risk and uncer-
tainty of harmful events.
Tomes can be and are written on costs, risk, and uncer-
tainty. More mathematical precision can also be given. For
our purposes, the key points in the definition of safety are
that: costs have to be sufficiently high in some human sense
for events to be harmful, and that safety involves reducing
both the probability of expected harms and the possibility of
unexpected harms.
III. SAFETY AND MACHINE LEARNING
The starting point in the theory and practice of statistical
machine learning is risk minimization. Given joint random
variables X ∈ X (features) and Y ∈ Y (labels) with
probability density function fX,Y (x, y), a function mapping
h ∈ H : X → Y , and a loss function L : Y ×
Y → R, the risk R(h) is the expectation E[L(h(X), Y )] =∫
X
∫
Y
L(h(x), y)fX,Y (x, y)dydx. The loss function L typi-
cally measures the discrepancy between the value predicted
for y using h(x) and y itself, for example (h(x) − y)2 in
regression problems. We would like to find the function h
that minimizes the risk.
However, in the machine learning context, we do not have
access to the probability fX,Y , but rather to a training set
of samples drawn i.i.d. from the joint distribution of X and
Y : {(x1, y1), . . . , (xm, ym)}. The empirical risk Rempm (h) is
1
m
∑m
i=1 L(h(xi), yi). The empirical risk minimization prin-
ciple formulates the learning of h as the minimization of
Rempm (h) [4]. Appealing to the results of Glivenko and Cantelli
in empirical process theory, it can be shown that the empirical
risk Rempm (h) converges to the risk R(h) uniformly for all
h as m goes to infinity. When m is small (in comparison
to a suitably defined complexity measure on H), minimizing
Rempm (h) may not yield an h that has small R(h). The struc-
tural risk minimization principle alleviates this problem by
restricting the complexity of H or introducing regularization
in the minimization problem for h based on some inductive
bias.
The risk minimization approach to machine learning has
many strengths, as evidenced by the innumerable applied
successes it has brought, and captures the risk component
of safety. However, it does not capture issues related to
uncertainty and loss functions that are relevant for safety.
First, although it is assumed that the training samples
{(x1, y1), . . . , (xm, ym)} are drawn from the true underlying
probability distribution of (X,Y ), that may not always be the
case. Furthermore, it may be that the distribution the samples
actually come from cannot be known, precluding the use of
covariate shift and domain adaptation techniques. This is one
form of epistemic uncertainty that is quite relevant to safety
because training on a data set from a different distribution can
cause much harm.
Also, it may be that the training samples do come from the
true, but unknown, underlying distribution, but are absent from
large parts of the X ×Y space due to small probability density
there. Here the learned h will be completely dependent on the
inductive bias rather than the uncertain true distribution, which
could introduce a safety hazard.
As mentioned above, statistical learning theory analysis
utilizes laws of large numbers to study the effect of finite
training data and the convergence of the empirical risk to
the true risk, but in considering safety, we should also be
cognizant that in deployment, a machine learning system only
encounters a finite number of test samples and the actual
operational risk is an empirical quantity on the test set. Thus
the operational risk may be much larger than the true risk
for small cardinality test sets, even if h is risk-optimal. This
uncertainty caused by the instantiation of the test set can have
large safety implications on individual test samples.
As we discussed above, the domain of the loss function
in risk minimization is Y × Y and the output is an abstract
quantity representing prediction error. However, in real-world
applications, the value of the loss function may be endowed
with some human cost and that human cost may imply a loss
function that also includes X in the domain. Moreover, the
cost may be severe enough to be harmful and thus a safety
issue in some parts of the domain and not in others.
IV. TYPE A AND TYPE B APPLICATIONS
Having described general considerations for machine learn-
ing in terms of safety in Section III, we examine safety
considerations in specific applications of machine learning
systems in this section.
A. Harmful Costs
We begin with the severity of unwanted outcomes. Predic-
tions made by machine learning systems in applications such
as medical diagnosis [8], loan approval [9], and prison sen-
tencing [10] can have a profound effect on people; undesired
outcomes are truly harmful in a human sense. In contrast, other
applications of machine learning are of a less consequential
nature; examples include streaming services deciding on the
compression level of video packets to transmit to subscribers
every few seconds [11], [12], web portals deciding which news
story to show on top [13], and speech transcription systems
classifying phonemes [14]. The quality of service implications
of unwanted outcomes in such applications are not safety
hazards.
Taking a more nuanced look at costs and undesirable predic-
tions, we note that loss functions are not always monotonic in
the correctness of predictions and depend on whose perspec-
tive is in the objective. Consider the loan approval application:
the applicant would like an approval decision regardless of
their features indicating ability to repay, the lender would like
approval only in cases in which applicant features indicate
likely repayment, and society would like there to be fairness
or equitability in the system so that protected groups, such as
defined by race and gender, are not discriminated against. The
lender perspective is consistent with the typical choice of loss
function, but the others are not.
B. Epistemic Uncertainty
The type of machine learning applications with potentially
harmful consequences and the type with harmless conse-
quences can be further analyzed with respect to epistemic
uncertainty. There is no a priori reason for the applications to
follow the same type structure when examining uncertainty,
but as we discuss in the following, the two types are recapit-
ulated. For ease of reference, let the medical diagnosis, loan
approval, prison sentencing-type applications constitute Type
A, and the other class of applications Type B. This is the same
nomenclature as in [6].
In addition to the lack of severity of costs, another char-
acteristic of Type B applications is that they are performed
at scales with large training sets, large testing sets, and the
ability to explore the feature space. For example, in the
web portal news story application, one can use billions of
data points as training, perform large-scale A/B testing, and
evaluate average performance on millions or billions of clicks.
For these reasons, the epistemic uncertainties discussed in
Section III are less prevalent in Type B applications than in
Type A applications. In contrast, in Type A applications it is
more often than not the case that there is uncertainty about the
training samples being representative of the testing samples,
and that only a few predictions are made. Uncertainty of the
various types discussed is common in Type A applications.
Thus, not only are errors in Type B applications less costly
in human terms, but the amount of uncertainty in the system is
less. Therefore, for both reasons, safety is much less relevant
in Type B applications than Type A applications. The focus
in Type B applications can be squarely on risk minimization
whereas Type A applications require the consideration of
strategies for achieving safety, as we discuss next.
V. STRATEGIES FOR ACHIEVING SAFETY
As discussed in the introduction, safety is usually inves-
tigated on an application-by-application basis and strategies
for achieving it the same. For example, setting the minimum
thickness of vessels and removing flammable materials from
a chemical plant are ways of achieving safety. Analyzing
such strategies across domains, [7] has identified four main
categories of approaches to achieve safety. In this section, we
discuss each of these categories in turn along with specific
approaches that extend machine learning formulations beyond
risk minimization for safety.
A. Inherently Safe Design
Inherently safe design is the exclusion of a potential hazard
from the system (instead of controlling the hazard). For
example, excluding hydrogen from the buoyant material of
a dirigible airship makes it safe. (Another possible safety
measure would be to introduce apparatus to prevent the
hydrogen from igniting.)
In the machine learning context, we would like robustness
against the uncertainty of the training set not being sampled
from the test distribution. The training set may have various
quirks or biases that are unknown to the user and that will not
be present during the test phase. Highly complex modeling
techniques used today, including extreme gradient boosting
and deep neural networks, may pick up on those data vagaries
in the learned models they produce to achieve high accuracy,
but might fail due to an unknown shift in the data domain.
The models are so complex that it is very difficult to
understand how they will react to such shifts and whether they
will produce harmful outcomes as a result. Two related ways to
introduce inherently safe design is by insisting on models that
can be interpreted by people and by excluding features that
are not causally-related to the outcome [15]. By examining
interpretable models, features or functions capturing quirks
in the data can be noted and excluded, thereby avoiding
related harm. Similarly, by excluding non-causal variables,
phenomena that are not a part of the true ‘physics’ of the
system can be excluded and related harm avoided.
The desire for neither interpretability nor causality of mod-
els is captured in the standard risk minimization formulation
of machine learning. Extra regularization or constraints on
H beyond those implied by structural risk minimization are
needed to learn such models. There may be performance loss
in accuracy by doing so when measuring accuracy with a
common training and testing data probability distribution, but
the reduction in epistemic uncertainty by doing so increases
safety. Both interpretability and causality may be incorporated
into a single learned model, e.g. [16].
B. Safety Reserves
A second strategy for achieving safety is through multiplica-
tive or additive reserves, known as safety factors and safety
margins, respectively. In mechanical systems, a safety factor is
a ratio between the maximal load that does not lead to failure
and the load for which the system was designed. Similarly the
safety margin is the difference between the two.
For the purposes of machine learning with uncertainty,
whether that uncertainty is in the training data matching the
test distribution or in the instantiation of the test set, we can
parameterize the unknown with the symbol θ. Let the risk
of the risk-optimal model if the θ were known be R∗(θ).
Along the same lines as safety factors and safety margins,
robust formulations find h while constraining or minimizing
maxθ
R(h,θ)
R∗(θ) or maxθ (R(h, θ)−R
∗(θ)). Such formulations
can capture uncertainty in the class priors and uncertainty
resulting from label noise in classification problems. They can
also capture the uncertainty of which part of the X space the
actual small set of test samples comes from: we do not care as
much about average test error for medical diagnosis problems
if a model will only be used on a handful of patients as we
do about the maximum test error.
A different sort of safety factor comes about when consid-
ering fairness and equitability. In certain prediction problems,
the risk of harm for members of protected groups should not
be much worse (up to a multiplicative factor) than the risk
of harm for others [17]. Features indicating a protected group,
such as race and gender, are dimensions in the X space; we can
partition the space into the sets Xp,Xu ⊂ X corresponding to
the protected and unprotected groups respectively. The safety
factor known as disparate impact constrains the following to
a minimum value such as 4/5:
∫
Xp
∫
Y
L(x, h(x), y)fX,Y (x, y)dydx
∫
Xu
∫
Y
L(x, h(x), y)fX,Y (x, y)dydx
.
Under such a constraint, the risk of harm for protected groups
is not much more than for unprotected groups.
C. Safe Fail
The third general category of safety measures is ‘safe fail,’
which implies that a system remains safe when it fails in its
intended operation. Examples are electrical fuses, so-called
dead man’s switches on trains, and safety valves on boilers.
A technique used in machine learning when predictions
cannot be given confidently is the reject option [18]: the
model reports that it cannot reliably give a prediction and does
not attempt to do so, thereby failing safely. When the model
elects the reject option, typically a human operator intervenes,
examines the test sample, and provides a manual prediction.
In classification problems, models are reported to be least
confident near the decision boundary. However, by doing so,
there is an implicit assumption that distance from the decision
boundary is inversely related to confidence. This is reasonable
in parts of X with high probability density and large numbers
of training samples because the decision boundary is located
where there is a large overlap in likelihood functions. However,
as discussed in Section III, parts of X with low density
may not contain any training samples at all and the decision
boundary may be completely based on an inductive bias,
thereby containing much epistemic uncertainty. In these parts
of the space, distance from the decision boundary is fairly
meaningless and the typical trigger for the reject option should
be avoided [19]. For a rare combination of features in a test
sample [20], a safe fail mechanism is to always go for manual
examination.
D. Procedural Safeguards
Finally, the fourth strategy for achieving safety is given the
name procedural safeguards. This strategy includes measures
beyond ones designed into the core functionality of the system,
such as audits, training, posted warnings, and so on. Two
directions in machine learning that can be used for increasing
safety within this category are user experience design and
openness.
In Type A applications especially, non-specialists are of-
ten the operators of machine learning systems. Defining the
training data set and setting up evaluation procedures, among
other things, have certain subtleties that can cause harm during
operation if done incorrectly. User experience design can be
used to guide and warn novice and experienced practitioners to
set up machine learning systems properly and thereby increase
safety.
Best of breed machine learning algorithms these days are
open source, which allows for the possibility of public audit.
Safety hazards and potential harms can be discovered through
examination of source code. However, open source software is
not enough, because the behavior of machine learning systems
is driven by data as much as it is by software implementations
of algorithms. Open data refers to data that can be freely used,
reused and redistributed by anyone. It is more common in Type
A applications such as those sponsored or run by governments
than in Type B applications where the data is oftentimes the
key value proposition. Opening data is a procedural safeguard
for increasing safety that is increasingly being adopted in Type
A applications.
VI. CONCLUSION
Machine learning systems are already embedded in many
functions of society. The prognosis is for broad adoption to
only increase across all areas of life. With this prevailing
trend, machine learning researchers, engineers, and ethicists
have started discussing the topic of safety. In this paper,
we contribute to this discussion starting from a very basic
definition of safety in terms of harm, risk, and uncertainty
and building upon it in the machine learning context. We
identify that the minimization of epistemic uncertainty is
missing from standard modes of machine learning developed
around risk minimization and that it needs to be included
when considering safety. We have delineated two types of
applications of machine learning: Type A in which safety is
an important concern and Type B in which it is not so. We
have discussed several strategies for increasing safety that are
especially pertinent in Type A applications.
Within safety engineering, there is a further subdivision
into the concepts of substantive safety and nominal safety.
All of the design elements in a nominally safe system meet
regulations and design criteria. Substantive safety is the long-
term performance that the system actually exhibits. We have
not made this distinction in this paper, but it is worth doing
so in future work.
Also, all of the safety discussion in this paper has been
related to predictions or outcomes based on predictions. How-
ever, there are other parts of a machine learning system
besides the core prediction component in which we should
also consider safety. For example, privacy and disclosure risk
in microdata release is a safety issue that is not part of the main
prediction model, but is part of the larger machine learning
sociotechnical system [6]. Further work should study all other
parts of machine learning in a similar fashion as this work,
starting from the first principles of safety in terms of cost, risk,
and uncertainty.
The strategies for increasing safety that we mentioned in
Section V are not a comprehensive list and are far from fully
developed. This paper can be seen as laying the foundations
for a research agenda motivated by Type A applications and
safety within which further strategies can be developed and
existing strategies can be fleshed out. In some respects, the
research community has taken risk minimization close to
the limits of what is achievable. Safety, especially epistemic
uncertainty minimization, represents a direction that offers new
and exciting problems to pursue. As it is said in the Sanskrit
literature, ahim
.
sa¯ paramo dharmah
.
(non-harm is the ultimate
direction).
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